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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
HOPE L. SNYDER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) CAUSE NO. 1:11-CV-77 
v. )
)
D. ANNE LIVINGSTON and EAR, )





Plaintiff Hope Snyder was employed by Defendant Ear, Nose & Throat Associates, PC 
(“ENT”) in its Hearing Center and Balance Center from February 2006 until June 10, 2011. 
While at the Hearing Center, Snyder worked with Defendant D. Anne Livingston. In March 
2010, Snyder and Livingston had a telephone conversation in which Snyder claims that 
Livingston called her “unstable.” Snyder contends that Livingston repeated this comment to 
several people at ENT, resulting in what she believes was a demotion, her transfer from the 
Hearing Center to the Balance Center, and ultimately her resignation from the Balance Center. 
On the other hand, Defendants argue that any perceived “demotion” was simply a restructuring 
of responsibilities and that Snyder’s decisions to transfer and resign were voluntary.
Subsequently, Snyder brought suit against Livingston and ENT, arguing that Livingston 
was liable for defamation under Indiana law (Am. Compl. ^ 2) and that ENT had regarded her as 
disabled, discriminated and retaliated against her, and created a hostile work environment, all in 
violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (Am.
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Compl. ^ 10).1 Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Snyder’s claims. (Docket # 
18.) As the motion is now ripe for ruling, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART for the reasons set forth below.
II. THE MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendants also moved to strike portions of Snyder’s affidavit, which was attached to her 
response, as contradicting her deposition testimony or constituting inadmissible hearsay. For the 
following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Certain Portions of the Affidavit of Hope L. 
Snyder (Docket # 45) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
A. Applicable Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that affidavits filed in support of summary 
judgment “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in 
evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). “An affidavit not in compliance with Rule 56 can neither lend support 
to, nor defeat, a summary judgment motion.” Paniaguas v. Aldon Cos., No. 2:04-CV-468-PRC, 
2006 WL 2568210, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2006) (citing Zayre Corp. v. S.M. & R. Co., 882 
F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1989); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th 
Cir. 1989)).
“[W]hen considering a motion to strike portions of an affidavit in support of a motion for 
summary judgment, courts will only strike and disregard the improper portions of the affidavit 
and allow all appropriate recitations of fact to stand.” Id.; see also Stromsen v. Alumna Shield
1 Jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is based on 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), all parties consenting. 
(See Docket # 12.)
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Indus., Inc., No. 89 C 5036, 1993 WL 34727, at *4 (N.D. 111. Feb. 8, 1993); Toro Co. v. Krouse, 
Kern & Co., 644 F. Supp. 986, 989 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2738 (3d ed. 2006). Specifically, the following statements are not 
properly included in an affidavit and should be disregarded: (1) conclusory allegations lacking 
supporting evidence, see Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 812 (7th Cir. 2011); (2) 
legal argument, see Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 862 (7th Cir. 1985); (3) self-serving 
statements without factual support in the record, Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 856 (7th 
Cir. 2011); (4) inferences or opinions not “grounded in observation or other first-hand 
experience,” Visser v. Packer Eng’gAssocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991); (5) mere 
speculation or conjecture, see Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 995 (7th Cir. 1999); and (6) 
statements or conclusions that contradict prior deposition or other sworn testimony, without 
explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity, see LaFary v. Rogers Grp., 
Inc., 591 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2010); Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 
1996).
B. Analysis
Here, Defendants seek to strike paragraphs 4, 8, and 9 of Snyder’s affidavit as 
contradicting her deposition testimony and paragraphs 7, 10, 11, and 14 as constituting 
inadmissible hearsay. The Court will address each category of objections in turn.
1. Contradiction Objections
Regarding the allegedly contradictory paragraphs, “[a] plaintiff cannot defeat a motion 
for summary judgment by ‘contradict[ing] deposition testimony with later-filed contradictory 
affidavits.’” LaFary, 591 F.3d at 908 (quoting Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir.
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2005)). Therefore, “[w]hen a conflict arises between a plaintiff’s sworn testimony and a later 
affidavit or declaration, the ‘affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is demonstrable that the 
statement in the deposition was mistaken . . . .’” Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 
759 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Piscione v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 171 F.3d 527, 532-33 (7th Cir. 
1999)). In the instant case, Defendants contend that paragraphs 4, 8, and 9 contradict Snyder’s 
deposition testimony and, therefore, should be stricken from her affidavit.
a. Paragraphs 4 and 9: Paragraphs 4 and 9, in which Snyder states that she was 
demoted from Director of Administration to Office Manager, do not directly contradict her 
deposition testimony. In her deposition, Snyder characterizes her change in job duties as a 
“demotion” several times. (See Snyder Dep. 16, 23-24, 130.) Accordingly, the statements in 
paragraphs 4 and 9 characterizing her change in job duties as a demotion are consistent with her 
deposition, and Defendants’ motion to strike is therefore DENIED as to paragraphs 4 and 9.
b. Paragraph 8: On the other hand, in paragraph 8 of her affidavit, Snyder states 
that “around [the] end of March or first of April,” she was called into a meeting with Dr. Rao, 
CEO Steve Sandquist, and Dr. Kaiser and told that many of her duties were being taken away 
and “[she] was being demoted.” Defendants contend that this contradicts Snyder’s deposition 
testimony that no one used the word “demotion” in talking to her about the change in her job 
duties. (Snyder Dep. 130-31.) In response, Snyder claims that her deposition testimony was 
referring to a conversation in May 2010, while her affidavit references a conversation in late 
March or early April. Thus, according to Snyder, these statements are not contradictory.
But Snyder was asked in her deposition, “Did anyone ever use the word demotion in 
talking with you about the change in your job duties had occurred [sic]?” (Snyder Dep. 130-31
4
(emphasis added).) Snyder responded, “Not the word demotion, no.” (Snyder Dep. 131.) 
Therefore, Snyder’s statement in paragraph 8 of her affidavit that she was told she was being 
demoted contradicts her deposition testimony that no one ever used the word demotion in talking 
to her about her change in job duties. Therefore, Snyder’s statement in paragraph 8 that she was 
told she was demoted should be stricken as contradictory, and Defendants’ motion to strike is 
hereby GRANTED with respect to this statement. The rest of paragraph 8 will be permitted to 
stand. Paniaguas, 2006 WL 2568210, at *4.
2. Hearsay Objections
It is well settled that “[a] party may not rely on inadmissible hearsay to avoid summary 
judgment.” MMG Fin. Corp. v. Midwest Amusements Park, LLC, 630 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 
2011) (citation omitted). As such, Defendants seek to strike paragraphs 7, 10, 11, and 14 as 
constituting inadmissible hearsay.
a. Paragraph 7: In paragraph 7, Snyder states that Dr. Michael Disher told her 
that Livingston had told Dr. Rao she was “emotionally unstable.” While Defendants argue that 
this is inadmissible hearsay, Snyder contends that it constitutes an admission by a party opponent 
and, thus, non-hearsay. Ultimately, whether this is hearsay is inconsequential because Snyder 
also testified in her deposition as to this statement (see Snyder Dep. 21), and Defendants do not 
move to strike this portion of Snyder’s deposition. Therefore, even if paragraph 7 were stricken, 
its substance would still come in via Snyder’s deposition testimony, which has not been 
challenged. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to strike paragraph 7 is MOOT.
b. Paragraph 10: Paragraph 10, in which Snyder claims that several managers 
told her that Livingston had been spreading the word at work that she was unstable within a day
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or two of March 16, 2010, is not material to the summary judgment inquiry; therefore, the Court 
declines to address this portion of the motion to strike.
c. Paragraph 11: Defendants challenge Snyder’s statements in paragraph 11 that 
Tom Boisimer had told her that others were making comments about her being unstable. These 
statements are relevant to Snyder’s hostile work environment claim. Nonetheless, even 
considering them, Defendants will be entitled to summary judgment on that claim. As such, the 
Defendants’ motion to strike paragraph 11 is MOOT as well.
d. Paragraph 14: Defendants also object to Snyder’s claim in paragraph 14 that 
“[a]fter the transfer Livingston continued telling people that [she] was unstable.” Snyder fails to 
lay any foundation for this statement or identify the “people” Livingston allegedly told of her 
instability. As such conclusory allegations lacking supporting evidence should be disregarded, 
Abuelyaman, 667 F.3d at 812, Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED as to this statement in 
paragraph 14. The remainder of the paragraph will stand. Paniaguas, 2006 WL 2568210, at *4.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In her Amended Complaint, Snyder brought a state law defamation claim against 
Livingston and the following claims against ENT: (1) a “regarded as disabled” claim; (2) a 
hostile work environment claim; and (3) a retaliation claim, all under the ADA; and (4) possibly, 
a constructive discharge claim. (See Am. Compl. ^  2, 9-10.) Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment attacking each of these claims. (Docket # 18.) Snyder’s response, however, 
explicitly abandons her state law defamation claim against Livingston and her retaliation claim 
against ENT and does not advance a constructive discharge claim. (See Pl.’s Resp. Br. in Opp. 
to Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) 2.) Any issues raised in the summary judgment motion that
6
the non-moving party does not respond to are deemed abandoned. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); 
Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). Therefore, 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED as to Snyder’s defamation and 
retaliation claims as well as any constructive discharge claim she may have brought.
Furthermore, as the Amended Complaint brings only a state law defamation claim against 
Livingston (see Am. Compl. ^ 2) and Snyder has explicitly abandoned that claim (see Pl.’s Resp. 
2), Livingston is entitled to summary judgment in her favor and dismissal from this case.2 As 
such, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED as to Livingston.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
Snyder began working at ENT as a Hearing Aid Dispenser in the Hearing Center on 
February 1, 2006. (Snyder Dep. 27; Sandquist Aff. ^ 3.) In May 2008, Snyder became Office 
Manager, a position she held until September 2009 when she assumed the role of Director of 
Administration. (Snyder Dep. 16, 27.) Snyder was the Director of Administration at the Hearing 
Center until April 2010. (Snyder Dep. 27-28.)
Livingston started her employment with ENT on November 19, 2007, as a staff 
audiologist (Livingston Aff. ^ 2); by March 2010, she was the Director of Dispensing Audiology 
(Snyder Dep. 17). From February 2008 to March 2010, Snyder considered Livingston a friend, 
and the two socialized outside of work. (Snyder Dep. 28; Snyder Aff. ^ 5.) Snyder openly 23
2
Even if Snyder’s Amended Complaint can be construed to bring ADA claims against Livingston, 
Livingston would still be entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the ADA provides for only 
employer, not individual, liability. Silk v. City o f Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Cordova 
v. Univ. o f Notre Dame Du Lac, No. 3:11-CV-210 RM, 2011 WL 6257290, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 13, 2011); Boyd- 
Radford v. Padilla, No. 2:10-CV-369-TLS, 2011 WL 710452, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 22, 2011).
3
For summary judgment purposes, the facts are recited in the light most favorable to Snyder, the 
nonmoving party. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).
7
discussed her attention deficit disorder (“ADD”) with Livingston and other co-workers. 
(Livingston Aff. ^ 3.) During the summer of 2008, Snyder also told Livingston about her 
psychological disorders and treatment. (Snyder Aff. ^ 5.) At some point, they talked about 
Snyder taking anti-depressants and, possibly, her postpartum depression. (Snyder Dep. 121-22.)
On March 12, 2010, Snyder spoke to Livingston on the telephone and indicated that she 
wanted to transfer to another ENT office. (Snyder Aff. ^ 6; Livingston Aff. ^ 5.) Livingston 
recalls Snyder being in tears. (Livingston Aff. ^ 5.) Livingston suggested that Snyder think 
about everything over the weekend, and then they would discuss the matter further the following 
week. (Livingston Aff. ^ 5; Snyder Aff. ^ 6.) On March 16, 2010, Snyder and Livingston had a 
second telephone conversation in which they argued with each other. (Livingston Aff. ^ 6; 
Snyder Aff. ^ 6; Snyder Dep. 15.) During this conversation, Snyder contends that Livingston 
called her “emotionally unstable”4 and told her she “should get help.” (Snyder Dep. 15; Snyder 
Aff. ^ 6.) Livingston maintains that she stated only that Snyder “appeared to be on a bit of an 
emotional roller coaster and that no one knew how to act around her.” (Livingston Aff. ^ 6.)
The following day, Snyder testified that Dr. Disher told her that Dr. Rao, an ENT 
physician supervisor, had told him that Livingston had repeated her comment that Snyder was 
“unstable” to Dr. Rao on March 16th. (Snyder Dep. 21.) Livingston admits that she may have 
repeated her comment about Snyder being on an emotional roller coaster, but denies that she 
used the phrase “mentally unstable” with anyone about Snyder. (Livingston Aff. ^ 7.)
According to Snyder, at the end of March or the beginning of April 2010, she had a 4
4 At other times, Snyder contends that Livingston called her “unstable” or “mentally unstable,” rather than 
emotionally unstable. (See Snyder Aff. ^  6, 10, 11.) The exact term allegedly used, however, is not particularly 
consequential.
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meeting with Dr. Rao; Steve Sandquist, ENT’s CEO; and a Dr. Kaiser, in which they changed 
her job duties and made her Office Manager. (Snyder Dep. 16-17; Snyder Aff ^ 9.) Snyder 
believes this was Dr. Rao’s decision. (Snyder Dep. 24-25.) After this meeting, Snyder alleges 
Livingston became her supervisor, where as before they had been equals; her payroll 
responsibilities were taken away; she could no longer do the time keeping for the office staff, 
make day-to-day decisions without contacting Livingston, or maintain the schedule; she was 
responsible for only one office instead of multiple ones; and she lost her opportunity for 
director’s bonuses. (Snyder Dep. 17, 23-24; Snyder Aff. ^  8, 13.) Snyder further maintains that 
a couple of weeks after this meeting, Livingston told her that some of her duties were being 
taken away to “take the burden off” of her. (Snyder Aff. ^ 8.) At the same time, Snyder’s pay, 
benefits, and work schedule did not change. (Snyder Dep. 24; Sandquist Aff. ^ 6.) Snyder 
characterizes this as a demotion (see Snyder Dep. 16, 23-24, 130), but admits that no one used 
the word “demotion” in talking about her change in duties (Snyder Dep. 130-31). According to 
Snyder, Dr. Rao did not indicate why her duties were changed or mention her physical or mental 
state, but did refer to Livingston’s characterization of her and the tension between them, noting 
they could not work together any longer or as equals. (Snyder Dep. 25.)
In Spring 2010, Dr. Disher was the physician responsible for the Hearing Center (and 
Snyder’s immediate supervisor). (Sandquist Aff. ^ 6; Snyder Dep. 16.) On May 10, 2010, ENT 
formally removed Dr. Disher from his responsibilities and restructured job responsibilities and 
duties of the Hearing Center’s physicians and personnel. (Sandquist Aff. ^ 6.) Sandquist 
maintains that, rather than Snyder being “demoted,” there was simply a reorganization of job 
responsibilities and duties. (Sandquist Aff. ^ 6.) He further contends that there was no change to
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Snyder’s job responsibilities or duties. (Sandquist Aff. ^ 6.) Both Livingston and Sandquist 
aver that at no time did they perceive Snyder as being disabled or unable to perform any of her 
work-related duties because she had ADD or any other emotional or mental problems or because 
of Livingston’s alleged comments. (Livingston Aff. ^ 4; Sandquist Aff. ^ 5.)
In April or May 2010, Snyder applied for a job as a Balance Technician at the Balance 
Center (Snyder Dep. 28; Snyder Aff. ^ 11), another entity owned by ENT (Sandquist Aff. ^ 2). 
She was offered this position some time in May. (See Snyder Dep. 28; Snyder Aff. ^ 11.) Her 
new supervisor was Tom Boismier. (Snyder Aff. ^ 4; Snyder Dep. 22.) According to Snyder, 
Boismier told her that upon hearing that he had hired Snyder, Director of Reception Carol 
Heffley expressed dismay that he was hiring “that mentally unstable girl.” (Snyder Dep. 22.)
On May 28, 2010, Snyder resigned from her position with the Hearing Center. (See 
Snyder Dep. Ex. D.) Snyder began her new position at the Balance Center on June 14, 2010. 
(Sandquist Aff. ^ 4.) She took a pay cut of $10,400 per year and lost the opportunity for bonuses 
and a $1,000 yearly continuing education allotment that she had previously received at the 
Hearing Center. (Snyder Aff. ^ 13.) Snyder also maintains that, once she transferred to the 
Balance Center, she was not able to use her hearing aid license and had restrictions placed on her 
that other employees did not. (Snyder Aff. ^  9, 12, 14.)
On August 11, 2010, Snyder filed a Charge of Discrimination against ENT, contending 
that ENT perceived her as being mentally disabled. (Snyder Dep. 72-73; Snyder Aff. ^ 15.) The 
basis for Snyder’s claim is Livingston’s alleged comment that she was “emotionally unstable.” 
(Snyder Dep. 73.) In her deposition, Snyder testified that she did not believe she was disabled 
under the ADA and explicitly limited her claim to a perceived mental disability. (Snyder Dep.
10
72-73.) Snyder filed a Second Charge of Discrimination on November 18, 2010, alleging 
disability discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. (Snyder Aff. ^ 15.) On May 13, 2011, 
Snyder resigned from her position as Balance Technician, effective June 10, 2011, thus ending 
her employment relationship with ENT. (See Snyder Dep. Ex. E; Sandquist Aff. ^ 4.)
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment may be granted only if there are no disputed genuine issues of 
material fact. Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court 
“may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to 
draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Id. The only task in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material 
dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 
507 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
If the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in favor of the 
nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. A court 
must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and avoid “the 
temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true,” as “summary 
judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants.” Id. However, “a party 
opposing summary judgment may not rest on the pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id. at 771.
VI. DISCUSSION
After winnowing the case down, the Court will now address Snyder’s remaining claims 
under the ADA: (1) disability discrimination and (2) a hostile work environment.
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A. ADA “Regarded As Disabled” Claim5 6
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” Hoffman v. Carefirst o f Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (N.D. Ind. 
2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). To prevail on an ADA discrimination claim, the plaintiff 
bears the burden of showing that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential 
function of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse 
employment action because of her disability.6 Id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 
F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2008)). An individual is considered disabled under the ADA if she has 
(1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of 
such individual”; (2) “a record of such an impairment”; or (C) is “regarded as having such an
5 When responding to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Snyder raises, for the first time, the 
claim that she had an actual impairment, namely ADD. (See Pl.’s Resp.7-8.) Defendants interpret this as Snyder’s 
attempt to pursue a new, actual disability claim. (See Defs.’ Reply 2-4.) It is well settled, however, that “[a] claim 
raised for the first time in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.” Chinn v. 
Cantrell, No. 2:04-cv-393, 2006 WL 2927595, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2006); see Aida Food & Liquor, Inc. v. City 
o f Chicago, 439 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] response to summary judgment is hardly a timely filing in 
which to raise an issue.”); Shanahan v. City o f Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A plaintiff may not 
amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”). Moreover, 
Snyder’s own deposition testimony explicitly limited her claim to that of a perceived disability. (See Snyder Dep. 
72-73.) Additionally, Snyder stated that the basis of her perceived disability claim was Livingston’s alleged 
comment that Snyder was “emotionally unstable”; no mention was made of Snyder’s ADD. (Snyder Dep. 73.) The 
summary judgment stage is too late for Snyder to add any claim of actual disability. See, e.g., Aida Food & Liquor, 
Inc., 439 F.3d at 402; Shanahan, 82 F.3d at 781; Chinn, 2006 WL 2927595, at *4. To the extent that Snyder argues 
that ADD is her actual impairment that caused ENT to regard her as disabled, this claim will be addressed below.
6 The ADA Amendments of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), effective 
January 1, 2009, apply to this case. While the elements cited here are derived from pre-amendment law, in Hoffman, 
737 F. Supp. 2d at 984, a case applying the ADAAA, the court relied on pre-amendment case law to set forth the 
elements of a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, which is consistent with what other district courts have done, 
see Becker v. Elmwood Local Sch. Dist., No. 3:10 CV 2487, 2012 WL 13569, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan 4. 2012) (citing 
6th Circuit cases relying on pre-amendment law for the prima facie elements of an ADA discrimination claim);
Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10-05562, 2011 WL 1899198, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2011) (citing Third Circuit cases 
from 1998 and 1996 for its recitation of the prima facie elements of an ADA discrimination claim). Therefore, it 
appears as if the prima facie elements of an ADA discrimination claim remain the same under the ADAAA.
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impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). As amended, “an individual meets the requirement of 
‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has 
been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
The first two requirements of the prima facie case are merely restatements of the 
statutory elements. Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 2006); Walter 
v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 4:09-CV-15 JD, 2011 WL 4537931, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 
2011). Once a plaintiff bears the burden of showing these first two elements, she can satisfy the 
third part of the test—that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her 
disability—by proceeding under the direct or indirect method of proof. Timmons, 469 F.3d at 
1127; Walter, 2011 WL 4537931, at *9; see Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th 
Cir. 2004).
1. A Factual Dispute Exists Concerning Whether Snyder Was“Regarded As Disabled”
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that, even if Livingston told 
others at ENT that Snyder was “mentally unstable,” this statement is insufficient as a matter of 
law to establish that Livingston, or anyone else at ENT, regarded Snyder as disabled. (Mem. of 
Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem. of Law”) 8.) But Defendants rely on a 
number of cases applying pre-amendment ADA law to support this proposition, which is 
problematic. (See Defs.’ Mem. of Law 8-11 (citing, among others, a 2004 District of Arizona 
case, a 2003 Seventh Circuit case, and a 2001 Eighth Circuit case).)
Prior to the ADAAA, a plaintiff proceeding under the “regarded as” prong had to show
13
that the employer mistakenly believed either that she had an impairment that substantially 
limited a major life activity or that her actual, but non-limiting, impairment substantially limited 
a major life activity. Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 556 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted). Congress amended the ADA, however, “to make it easier for people with 
disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4); see ADAAA, Pub.
L. No. 110-325 (stating that one of the purposes of the ADAAA is “reinstating a broad scope of 
protection to be available under the ADA”); Hoffman, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 984. According to the 
regulations, the definition of “disability” is to be construed broadly in favor of expansive 
coverage, and the primary focus in ADA cases “should be whether covered entities have 
complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the 
individual meets the definition of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4). Consistent with this 
purpose, “while the ADA previously required the perceived disability to substantially limit a 
major life activity, the [ADAAA] removed this hurdle,” and the “ADA now includes perceived 
disabilities ‘whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.’” 
Becker, 2012 WL 13569, at *9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). Accordingly, as the ADAAA 
changed the interpretation of the disability categories and broadened the ADA’s scope, Hoffman, 
737 F. Supp. 2d at 984, relying on cases applying the pre-amendment version of the ADA is 
unpersuasive, see Becker, 2012 WL 13569, at *10 (noting that, despite factual similarities 
between the present case and a prior one, the court was unpersuaded because the prior case relied 
on the pre-amendment version of the ADA).
Here, the Defendants rely on several cases for the proposition that calling someone 
“mentally unstable” is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a “regarded as disabled” claim.
14
(See Defs.’ Mem. of Law 8-11.) All these cases, however, apply the pre-amendment ADA, 
which required the plaintiff show that an actual or perceived impairment was regarded as 
substantially limiting a major life activity, Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 556. (See Defs.’ Mem. of Law 
8-9 (citing Roberts v. Dimension Aviation, 319 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990 (D. Ariz. 2004) (holding 
that insults such as “Del, short for deliverance,” “stupid,” “retarded,” and “fag” are insufficient 
to establish that the plaintiff was regarded as disabled, which the court explicitly stated required 
that the perceived impairment be “substantially limiting and significant”)), 9-10 (citing Tockes v. 
Air-Land Transp. Servs., Inc., 343 F.3d 895, 896 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that calling the 
plaintiff “crippled,” “disabled,” and “handicapped” was insufficient to establish ADA protection 
when “there is no evidence that his employer harbored the erroneous belief that he was disabled 
within the meaning o f the Act,” which would have been the more restrictive, pre-amendment 
meaning of “regarded as disabled”) (emphasis in original)), 10 (citing Costello v. Mitchell Public 
Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying the pre-amendment ADA to hold that, 
with evidence showing that defendants treated plaintiff as if she was a student without a 
substantially limiting impairment, mere name-calling was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact on the plaintiff’s perceived disability claim)).)
Ultimately, Defendants’ reliance on case law applying the pre-amendment ADA fails to 
show that calling Snyder mentally unstable is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that 
Snyder was not regarded as disabled under the amended, more expansive version of the ADA. 
Furthermore, according to the new regulations, this Court is not supposed to engage in an 
extensive analysis of whether Snyder is disabled under the ADA, but rather focus on whether 
ENT has complied with its obligations and whether discrimination has occurred. 20 C.F.R. §
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1630.1(c)(4). Here, despite statements in affidavits from Livingston and Sandquist that they did 
not perceive Snyder as disabled, there is sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute as to 
whether Livingston or others at ENT regarded Snyder as disabled, including what Livingston’s 
comment actually was—that Snyder was either unstable or on a “bit of an emotional 
rollercoaster”—and whether Livingston then repeated the “unstable” comment, as Snyder 
alleges, or merely the “emotional roller coaster” comment, as Livingston admits (Livingston Aff 
^ 7), to others at ENT. Therefore, Snyder has presented enough evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that ENT regarded her as disabled.
Finally, Snyder also argues that she had an actual impairment—ADD. While ADD may 
constitute a mental impairment within the meaning of the ADA, see Davidson v. Midelfort 
Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998); Stutler v. Cellco P ’ship, No. 3:10-cv-352, 2012 
WL 425770, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 9, 2012), Snyder explicitly testified at her deposition that her 
perceived disability was a mental disability and, when asked if her perceived disability was 
“anything more specific than that,” replied in the negative. (Snyder Dep. 72-73.) She did not 
mention her ADD—a recognized mental impairment under the ADA—or any other specific 
mental impairment in response to such direct questioning. Instead, she expressly stated that she 
was not perceived as having anything more specific than a “mental disability.” Even if Snyder 
had not so limited her claim in her deposition, there is sufficient evidence that Livingston and 
others at ENT knew about Snyder’s ADD well before her alleged demotion (see Livingston Aff. 
^ 3; Snyder Aff. ^ 5), and Snyder presents no evidence causally linking any adverse employment 
action with her ADD. As such, Snyder’s ADD argument is a non-starter.
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2. No One Appears to Dispute that Snyder Was a Qualified Individual
After establishing disability, Snyder must demonstrate that she is a “qualified individual” 
under the ADA. Walter, 2011 WL 4537931, at *10 (citations omitted). “An individual is 
considered ‘qualified’ if [she] can perform the essential functions of the employment position 
that [she] holds or desires, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Id. (citations omitted); 
see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). ENT does not appear to contest that Snyder was qualified to perform 
the essential functions of her employment position. The only explanation they offer for her 
change in duties was a restructuring of responsibilities and duties. (Sandquist Aff ^ 6.) There 
are no allegations that Snyder’s duties were changed because she was not qualified or otherwise 
unable to do her job. Furthermore, Defendants do not contend that Snyder was effectively forced 
to transfer or resign because of poor performance; rather, they argue that Snyder voluntarily 
decided to transfer, and ultimately to resign from, the Balance Center. Snyder further maintains 
that no one ever told her she was having a performance problem (Snyder Aff. ^ 8), which 
Defendants do not dispute. As such, as it does not appear to be contested, Snyder has borne her 
burden of establishing she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA.
3. There Are Genuine Issues o f Material Fact Regarding Whether Snyder Suffered an 
Adverse Employment Action Because o f Her Disability
Once Snyder has established that she is protected by the ADA, she can prove disability 
discrimination by using the direct or indirect method of proof. Dickerson v. Bd. o f Trs. o f Cmty. 
Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011). Snyder proceeds under only the direct 
method. (See Pl.’s Resp. 8-11.)
a. Adverse Employment Action
Even proceeding under the direct method, Snyder must demonstrate that she suffered an
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adverse employment action. Dass v. Chicago Bd. o f Educ., F.3d , 2012 WL 1228188, at *7
(7th Cir. Apr. 12, 2012). As such, Snyder argues that an adverse employment action occurred 
when her duties were changed and her position was reduced from Director of Administration to 
Officer Manager, resulting in a loss of status and opportunity for advancement. (Pl.’s Resp. 9.) 
On the other hand, Defendants contend this is not an adverse employment action because 
Snyder’s pay and benefits did not change. (Defs.’ Reply 9-11.)
An adverse employment action is “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an 
alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a 
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, 
or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 
788 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Nevertheless, “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” 
Dass, 2012 WL 1228188, at *8 (quoting O ’Neal v. City o f Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 
2004)). At a minimum, the plaintiff “must show quantitative or qualitative change in the terms 
or conditions of his employment that is more than a mere subjective preference.” Johnson v. 
Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003).
As the Seventh Circuit has articulated, adverse employment actions generally fall into 
three categories: “(1) termination or reduction in compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial 
terms of employment; (2) transfers or changes in job duties that cause an employee’s skills to 
atrophy and reduce future career prospects; and (3) unbearable changes in job conditions, such as 
hostile work environment or conditions amounting to constructive discharge.” Barton v.
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Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). These categories are not 
meant to cover cases of “purely subjective preference for one position over another.” 
Herrnreither v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002). As such, cases in the 
second category should be distinguished from cases involving a purely lateral transfer—a 
transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance. Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 
F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Hicks v. Sheahan, No. 03 C 0327, 2004 
WL 3119016, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2004) (finding that an employment action did not fall 
into the second category when the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the transfer 
reduced his career prospects or that his responsibilities were less significant than those of his 
prior position).
Nonetheless, while “mere lateral transfers, even if accompanied by bruised egos and 
petty slights, are not adverse employment actions,” despite these general categories, courts have 
found that “under certain circumstances, a plaintiff’s transfer can be considered an adverse
employment action even if his salary and benefits remain steady.” Williams v. Lovchik, F.
Supp. 2d__, 2011 WL 5593669, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2011); see also Tart v. Ill. Power
Co., 366 F.3d 461, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding it reasonable for a jury to conclude that the 
plaintiffs’ reassignment was an adverse employment action because it placed them in positions 
that were objectively inferior and involved far less skill and independence and significantly 
harsher working conditions than their previous ones, even though their pay, title, and benefits 
were unchanged). For example, “an adverse employment action can occur where an employee’s 
new position is considered less important within the organization, where it requires less skill or 
brainpower, or where it results in significant reduction in responsibilities.” Williams, 2011 WL
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5593669, at *14; see, e.g., Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(transfer to position that was considered less important in the office hierarchy could be deemed 
an adverse employment action despite no reduction in pay or benefits); Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 
253, 257 (7th Cir. 1994) (changing plaintiff’s duties from a mix of intellectually stimulating and 
routine job responsibilities to only routine duties is a “dramatic downward shift in skill level” 
that “can rise to the level of an adverse employment action”).
As for reduced responsibilities, both the Seventh Circuit and district courts within the 
circuit have found adverse employment actions when the plaintiff’s responsibilities are 
significantly diminished, despite no change in pay or benefits. Timmons, 469 F.3d at 1128 
(finding that placing the plaintiff on disability leave was an adverse employment action when, 
although he still received the equivalent of his old salary through social security and disability 
payments, his material responsibilities were undoubtedly diminished); Hoffman-Dombrowski v. 
Arlington In t’lRacecourse, Inc., 254 F.3d 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a rational jury 
could find that the plaintiff’s responsibilities were diminished to the extent that she suffered an 
adverse employment action when her responsibilities were decreased from preparing the budget 
and payroll and staffing hundreds of clerks to emptying lottery machines and scheduling only 
five clerks, even though her title and compensation remained the same); Riddle v. Bed, Bath & 
Beyond, No. 1:06-cv-289-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 1597921, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 31, 2007) (noting 
that transfers can still be adverse employment actions even if the pay remains the same or is 
greater so long as some material diminution of responsibilities or benefits can be demonstrated); 
Davis v. Harris, No. 03-3007, 2006 WL 3321630, at *22 (C D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2006) (noting that a 
significant reduction in responsibilities can constitute an adverse employment action).
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On the other hand, a title change in which the employee’s responsibilities, salary, 
benefits, and opportunities for promotion stay the same does not qualify as an adverse 
employment action. Maclin, 520 F.3d at 789 (citation omitted). Similarly, a “title change and 
different reporting relationship [is] largely semantic ‘where the employee’s salary, benefits, and 
level of responsibility would remain unchanged.’” Tart, 366 F.3d at 747 (quoting Flaherty v.
Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Here, neither party attempts to place Snyder’s changed responsibilities7 and alleged 
demotion within or outside of the Seventh Circuit’s three categories. The closest category 
appears to be the second—transfers or changes in job duties that significantly reduce the 
employee’s career prospects. Admittedly, Snyder’s change in duties does not fall directly into 
this category, but, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Snyder, it does not fall outside 
the realm of actionable employment actions either. These categories are meant to exclude a 
“purely subjective preference for one position over another,” Herrneirther, 315 F.3d at 745; yet, 
as explicated below, Snyder’s change of duties and reduction in title is not merely a subjective 
preference. Moreover, cases in the second category are ones that do not involve a demotion in 
form or substance, Maclin, 520 F.3d at 788, but, in this case, a reasonable jury could find that 
Snyder suffered a demotion in substance, even though her pay and benefits remained the same, 
particularly since her responsibilities were significantly diminished, see Hicks, 2004 WL 
3119016, at *20 (finding that an employment action did not fall into the second category when
7
Although Sandquist avers that there was no change to Snyder’s job responsibilities or duties (Sandquist If 
6), Defendants do not otherwise dispute that Snyder’s duties and responsibilities were changed (See Defs.’ Reply 10­
11). Sandquist’s statement that Snyder’s duties and responsibilities were not changed could, in and of itself, create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Snyder’s duties were changed at all, thereby precluding summary 
judgment. Defendants, however, appear to concede that Snyder’s duties were changed and argue that an alteration 
ofjob responsibilities does not qualify as an adverse employment action. (See Defs. Reply 10-11.)
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the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the transfer reduced his career prospects or that 
his responsibilities were less significant than those o f his prior position). Therefore, Snyder has 
presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered an 
adverse employment action.
First, Snyder alleges that she experienced a loss of status and an accompanying 
opportunity for advancement when her position was reduced from Director of Administration to 
Office Manager. (Pl.’s Resp. 9.) This new position was less prestigious and would be 
considered “less important” within ENT than her previous one, which suggests an adverse 
employment action occurred. See Patterson, 589 F.3d at 365; Williams, 2011 WL 5593669, at 
*14. At the same time, Snyder’s title was not simply changed to a less prestigious one; her 
responsibilities and independence were significantly diminished as well, strengthening her 
argument that she suffered an adverse employment action. See Williams, 2011 WL 5593669, at 
*14; cf. Maclin, 520 F.3d at 789 (stating that a title change without any accompanying change in 
an employee’s responsibilities, salary, benefits, and opportunities for promotion does not qualify 
as an adverse employment action). Reminiscent of the plaintiff in Hoffman-Dombrowski, 254 
F.3d at 651, whose responsibilities were decreased from preparing the budget and payroll and 
staffing hundreds of clerks to emptying lottery machines and scheduling only five clerks, once 
her position was reduced from Director of Administration to Office Manager, Snyder went from 
being in charge of multiple offices to just one and had her payroll, time keeping, and scheduling 
responsibilities taken away. As the Seventh Circuit held in Hoffman-Dombrowski, a rational 
jury could find that Snyder’s responsibilities were diminished to the extent that she suffered an 
adverse employment action. Id.; see, e.g., Timmons, 469 F.3d at 1128; Riddle, 2007 WL
22
1597921, at *6; Davis, 2006 WL 3321630, at *22.
Beyond having her title changed and responsibilities reduced, Snyder was also put under 
the supervision of Livingston, the person who had allegedly called her “unstable,” whereas 
before they had been equals. While a title change and different reporting relationship is largely 
semantic where the employee’s salary, benefits, and level of responsibility stay the same, Tart, 
366 F.3d at 747, Snyder’s level of responsibility did not stay the same; rather, many of her duties 
were taken away and she could no longer make daily decisions without Livingston’s approval, 
making this change in reporting relationship and title more than mere semantics. Moreover, 
Snyder’s lack of independence in making daily decisions, being in charge of only one office 
instead of multiple ones as before, and having her payroll, time keeping, and scheduling 
responsibilities taken away would arguably require Snyder to use less skill or brainpower, 
further suggesting that an adverse employment action occurred. See Tart, 366 F.3d, at 743-74; 
Dahm, 60 F.3d at 257; Williams, 2011 WL 5593669, at *14.
Snyder also states that she lost an opportunity for director’s bonuses when her position 
was reduced. (Snyder Aff ^ 13.) But the loss of a bonus is not an adverse employment action 
unless the employee is automatically entitled to it. SeeMaclin, 520 F.3d at 788. Here, it is 
unclear whether the director’s bonus was discretionary or automatic. Either way, Snyder is not 
claiming that she was actually denied a director’s bonus, but merely that she lost the opportunity 
for director’s bonuses when her position was reduced. Such a material loss of benefits adds an 
additional level of adversity to Snyder’s reduced responsibilities and position that could lead to a 
finding that she suffered an adverse employment action. See Traylor, 295 F.3d at 788 (noting 
that “a materially adverse change might be indicated by . . . a material loss of benefits”); see
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also Dilettoso v. Potter, No. CV 04-0566-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 197146, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 25, 
2006) (holding that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when he was placed on 
administrative leave for nine months, during which he missed an opportunity to earn a $1,000 
bonus); cf. Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 96-97 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding a lateral transfer 
resulting in the lost opportunity to earn overtime pay may constitute an adverse employment 
action). Arguably, the terms, conditions, and privileges of Snyder’s employment were affected 
by her reduced title, such that she suffered an adverse employment action, because it resulted in 
the loss of the opportunity to receive future director’s bonuses. See Bush v. Am. Honda Motor 
Co., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 780, 790 n.8 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that the terms, conditions, and 
privileges of the plaintiff’s employment were not affected by her demotion, such that she could 
show an adverse employment action, when her demotion did not result in the loss of any income 
or other benefits, including the opportunity to receive future bonuses or promotions).
Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Snyder, although her pay, benefits, 
and work schedule remained the same, Snyder’s significant reduction in duties, supervisory 
responsibilities, and independence; placement in a less prestigious position, where she was under 
Livingston’s supervision; and loss of opportunity for director’s bonuses are sufficient to raise a 
factual issue as to whether Snyder suffered an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Traylor,
295 F.3d at 788 (noting that an adverse employment action includes a demotion evidenced by a 
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, or significantly 
diminished material responsibilities). Furthermore, in a case such as this, where there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the degree of adversity Snyder suffered and whether it rises 
to the level of an adverse employment action, the question is appropriately left to the jury. See
24
Lewis v. City o f Chicago Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 436 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that when the 
degree of adversity is substantially in doubt, the jury is appropriately presented with the issue). 
b. Direct Method
Having demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether an adverse 
employment action occurred, Snyder proceeds under the direct method to prove that ENT 
discriminated against her because of her perceived disability. See Timmons, 469 F.3d at 1127. 
Under the direct method, a plaintiff must offer either direct evidence that would prove the 
discriminatory intent without reliance on inference or presumption or “a convincing mosaic” of 
circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the 
decisionmaker. Silverman v. Bd. o f Educ. o f City o f Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 
2011) (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has recently stated that this “mosaic” language 
“articulate[s] the principle that, for a plaintiff proceeding under the direct method to defeat 
summary judgment using circumstantial evidence, ‘[a]ll that is required is evidence from which a 
rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that the defendant had [taken an adverse employment 
action against] the plaintiff because the latter was a member of a protected class.’” Dass, 2012 
WL 1228188, at *10 (quoting Hanners v. Trent, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 899062, at *7 (7th Cir. 
Mar. 19, 2012)). This type of circumstantial evidence includes, among others, suspicious timing, 
ambiguous oral or written statements, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees 
in the protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent 
might be drawn. Id. The circumstantial evidence presented “must point directly to a 
discriminatory reason for the employer’s action” and be “directly related to the employment 
decision.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Snyder relies partly on suspicious timing. According to Snyder, her change of duties and 
purported demotion occurred at the end of March or beginning of April 2010 as a result of the 
March 16th conversation in which Livingston allegedly called her unstable. (Snyder Dep. 16-17; 
Snyder Aff. ^ 9.) Another part of her deposition, however, suggests that she was demoted on 
May 12, 2010. (Snyder Dep. 130.) When Snyder’s duties changed is highly significant, 
especially regarding Snyder’s suspicious timing argument, as ENT’s stated reason for changing 
Snyder’s job responsibilities was the restructuring of the Hearing Center as a result of Dr. 
Disher’s formal removal as the physician responsible for the Hearing Center on May 10, 2010. 
(Sandquist Aff. ^ 6.) If the change of duties occurred at the end of March or beginning of April, 
instead of May 12th, then ENT’s stated reason for changing Snyder’s duties becomes highly 
suspect because Snyder’s responsibilities would have been changed over a month before Dr. 
Disher’s formal removal. Moreover, if Snyder’s responsibilities changed in late March or early 
April, this is potentially a little over two weeks after Livingston purportedly labeled her unstable.
While, by itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact 
as to causation, it could suffice where the adverse action followed on the heels of the employer’s 
discovery of the employee’s disability. Buie, 366 F.3d at 506-07; see Gibson v. M & MServ. 
Station Equip. Specialist, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00861-SEB-DML, 2009 WL 899660, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 
Mar. 30, 2009) (denying summary judgment on ADA claim when there was circumstantial 
evidence that three days separated the plaintiff telling employees of his need for surgery and the 
date he was terminated); cf. King v. Preferred Technical Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(reasoning that temporal proximity created an issue of fact where the plaintiff’s termination 
occurred one day after she finished her FMLA leave). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has “found
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that three to four months between [an allegedly discriminatory] remark and an employment 
action is not so long as to defeat the inference of a causal nexus.” Darchak v. City o f Chicago 
Bd. o f Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Bellaver v. Quanex Corp, 200 F.3d 485, 
493 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Here, while a gap of a little over two weeks is outside the one- or three-day period courts 
have deemed sufficient to survive summary judgment, see King, 166 F.3d at 893; Gibson, 2009 
WL 899660, at *7, it is well within the three to four months that the Seventh Circuit has found is 
not so long as to defeat the inference of a casual connection, Darchak, 580 F.3d at 632. 
Furthermore, Snyder’s duties were changed potentially within fourteen days of Livingston’s 
alleged comment despite her never having any performance problems or indicating she wanted a 
decreased workload (Snyder Aff. ^ 8), adding more support to her suspicious timing argument. 
Cf Jenkins v. Cummins, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-313-TWP-DKL, 2012 WL 1028826, at *10 (S.D. Ind. 
Mar. 26, 2012) (finding suspicious timing for a retaliation claim when the plaintiff was fired less 
than six weeks after making a complaint and was told an investigation into his time records was 
being conducted within days of this complaint, particularly since nothing had ever been said to 
the plaintiff about his time and attendance before the complaint). Regardless, Snyder does not 
rely entirely on suspicious timing to avoid summary judgment. See Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, 
Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the mere fact that one event preceded 
another does not prove the first caused the second and that “other circumstances must also be 
present which reasonably suggest that the two events are somehow related to one another”).
Snyder also points to other evidence in the record in support of her circumstantial 
evidence argument. For example, Snyder alleges that, within a couple of weeks of the late
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March or early April meeting, Livingston told her that her duties were being taken away to “take 
the burden off’ of her. (Snyder Aff. ^ 8.) Yet Snyder avers that she never asked to have her 
duties reduced and was never told she was having a performance problem. (Snyder Aff. ^ 8.) 
Notably, the record is unclear as Snyder’s affidavit seems to suggest that she had some 
responsibilities, including her payroll, time keeping, and scheduling duties, taken away by Dr. 
Rao at the end of March or beginning of April and then other, unidentified duties taken away by 
Livingston a couple of weeks later, after Livingston became Snyder’s supervisor. (Snyder Aff. ^ 
8.) Whether Livingston, as Snyder’s supervisor, decided to take some of Snyder’s duties away is 
significant because a remark can raise an inference of discrimination if it was made by the 
decisionmaker, around the time of the decision, and in reference to the adverse employment 
action. Dass, 2012 WL 1228188, at *11 (citation omitted). If Livingston was the decisionmaker 
with regard to a second stripping of duties, her “take the burden off’ comment to Snyder would 
have been around the time of this second decision and in reference to it. If Snyder never asked 
to have her duties reduced and was not having a performance problem, then Livingston’s “take 
the burden off’ comment could lead to an inference that Snyder’s purported “burden” was not 
her workload or performance, but rather her mental and emotional state.
Even if Livingston was not responsible for a second stripping of duties, there is evidence 
that the decisionmaker for Snyder’s change of duties in late March or early April, Dr. Rao, knew 
of Livingston’s “unstable” comment, which is necessary for an inference of causation. See 
LaFary, 591 F.3d at 908 (stating that the plaintiff could not prove a critical element of her 
pregnancy discrimination claim when she did not introduce evidence that the defendant knew 
about her pregnancy before it decided to transfer her). For instance, Snyder testified that Dr.
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Disher told her that Dr. Rao had told him that Livingston had repeated to Dr. Rao the “unstable” 
comment the day after the March 16th phone conversation. (Snyder Dep. 21.) Furthermore, 
according to Snyder, while Dr. Rao did not refer to Snyder’s mental state during the meeting in 
which her duties were altered, Dr. Rao did reference Livingston’s characterization of Snyder in 
this meeting, allegedly saying that he did not like the tension between them and that Livingston 
and Snyder could no longer work together or as equals. (Snyder Dep. 25.) Yet, in this meeting, 
Dr. Rao purportedly decided that Snyder would be under Livingston rather than vice versa. 
Considering the timing of the decision—potentially just two weeks after Livingston’s alleged 
comment—a reasonable jury could infer that Snyder was subordinated to Livingston (rather than 
the opposite) and effectively demoted because of a perceived disability—her mental or 
emotional instability. See Dass, 2012 WL 1228188, at *10.
Accordingly, having submitted sufficient evidence to raise a number of genuine factual 
issues, Snyder’s “regarded as disabled” claim under the ADA survives summary judgment; as 
such, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim will be DENIED.
B. Hostile Work Environment Claim Under the ADA
As her remaining claim, Snyder argues that ENT subjected her to a hostile work 
environment in violation of the ADA. The Seventh Circuit, however, has not yet decided 
whether the ADA encompasses a cause of action for hostile work environment, but has assumed 
the existence of such claim where resolution of the issue has not been necessary and that the 
standards for proving such a claim would mirror those established for hostile work environment 
claims brought under Title VII. Mannie v. Potter, 394 F.3d 977, 982 (7th Cir. 2005); Jenkins, 
2012 WL 1028826, at *6 n.6. Therefore, for Snyder’s hostile work environment claim to survive
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summary judgment, Snyder must show the following: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome 
harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her perceived disability; (3) the harassment was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile 
or abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 
389 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2004); Jenkins, 2012 WL 1028826, at *7.
Snyder’s allegations of a hostile work environment fail to rise to the level of “severe and 
pervasive,” as required by the third prong, precluding her from surviving summary judgment on 
this claim. Under the third prong, Snyder must prove that her workplace was both subjectively 
and objectively hostile; “[a]n objectively hostile environment is one that a reasonable person 
would find hostile or abusive.” Mannie, 394 F.3d at 982 (citation omitted). Accordingly,
Snyder “must demonstrate that a rational trier of fact could find that [her] workplace is 
permeated with discriminatory conduct—intimidation, ridicule, insult—that is sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.” Silk, 194 F.3d at 804. “In determining 
whether a plaintiff has met this standard, courts must consider all the circumstances, including 
‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening 
or humiliating[,] or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.’” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 
(1993)). The Seventh Circuit has further held that the an actionable workplace is one that is 
“hellish.” Whitaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645-646 (7th Cir. 2005).
Here, Snyder argues that Livingston’s alleged “unstable” comment and the repetition of it 
“were of a quality that any reasonable person in Snyder’s shoes would have been offended.” 
(Pl.’s Resp. 13-14.) An objectively hostile work environment, however, is “one that a
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reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,” not merely offensive. Mannie, 394 F.3d at 982 
(emphasis added). Moreover, a factor to consider is whether the conduct was “physically 
threatening or humiliating[,] or a mere offensive utterance,” Silk, 194 F.3d at 804 (emphasis 
added). Snyder makes no allegations that any one physically threatened or humiliated her; she 
alleges only that the repetition of the unstable comment, combined with her demotion and 
stripping of her duties, caused her to experience a level of stress, anxiety, and sadness to such a 
degree that her psychiatric medication had to be increased. (Pl.’s Resp. 14.) Yet Snyder 
presents no evidence beyond her own self-serving affidavit that her psychiatric medication was 
increased because of the alleged repetition of the unstable comment. See Teninty v. Geren, 776 
F. Supp. 2d 725, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence 
corroborating her own testimony regarding her allegations and perceptions of harassment in 
granting summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim).
Even assuming that Snyder’s psychiatric medication was increased because of these 
comments, Snyder makes no attempt to show that the repetition of these subjectively offensive 
allegations were so severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment or 
unreasonably interfere with her work performance. See Luckie, 389 F.3d at 713; Silk, 194 F.3d 
at 804; Jenkins, 2012 WL 1028826, at *7. While she alleges that these comments caused her to 
leave the Hearing Center for a lower paying job at the Balance Center, and ultimately resign 
from the Balance Center a year later, she presents no evidence contradicting the Defendants’ 
assertion that these were voluntary decisions; she has also failed to respond to Defendants’ 
argument regarding any constructive discharge claim she may have brought, thereby abandoning 
the claim. See Palmer, 327 F.3d at 597-98. Ultimately, even accepting Snyder’s allegations as
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true, a reasonable person would not find the repetition of Livingston’s “unstable” comment to be 
hostile or abusive.
Snyder further alleges that she ended her employment relationship with ENT because 
even working at the Balance Center was “unhealthy” for her. (Snyder Aff. ^ 16.) Title VII—and 
therefore, the ADA, which would borrow Title VII’s standards—“does not guarantee a utopian 
workplace, or even a pleasant one.” Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Bd., 276 F.3d 334, 339 
(7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). While Snyder’s allegations establish that she was unhappy 
working at ENT, such allegations fall far short of creating an actionable workplace, Teninty, 776 
F. Supp. 2d at 740, which is a “hellish” one, Whitaker, 424 F.3d at 645-646. Accordingly, as 
Snyder’s allegations, even if accepted as true, fall short of this high standard, Snyder cannot 
establish aprimafacie case of a hostile work environment, and the Court will GRANT 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Snyder’s hostile work environment claim.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Docket # 18) as to Snyder’s ADA “regarded as disabled” claim and GRANTS 
Defendants’ Motion as to Snyder’s hostile work environment, retaliation, defamation, and 
constructive discharge claims. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant D.
Anne Livingston on all claims.
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 27th day of April, 2012.
/s/ Roger B. Cosbey________
Roger B. Cosbey
United States Magistrate Judge
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